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Bodily saturation and social disconnectedness in depression 
 
Abstract 
Individuals suffering from depression consistently report experiencing a lack of connectedness 
with others. David Karp (2017, 73), in his memoir and study of depression, has gone so far to 
describe depression as “an illness of isolation, a disease of disconnectedness”. It has become 
common, in phenomenological circles, to attribute this social impairment to the depressed 
individual experiencing their body as corporealized, acting as a barrier between them and the 
world around them (Fuchs 2005, 2016). In this paper, I offer an alternative view of the 
experience of social disconnectedness in depression, suggesting that rather than necessarily 
experiencing their body as object-like, the depressed individual’s bodily is saturated with 
experiences of lethargy, tiredness, heaviness, sadness, hopelessness and so on, to the exclusion 
of being able to bodily connect to others. I suggest that depression does not involve a complete 
social impairment but a specific impairment of affective forms of interpersonal experience.   
Keywords: depression; phenomenological psychopathology; social impairment; bodily 
saturation; interaffectivity; self-harm   
Introduction 
While depression is often associated with feeling deadened or flat, depression is a bodily 
intense experience. As the DSM-V highlights, depression is characterized, inter alia, by 
feelings of lethargy, tiredness, heaviness, sadness, guilt and/or hopelessness. It also notes that 
depression can “cause significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other 
important areas of functioning” (APA 2013, 163). Although the DSM makes explicit reference 
to experiential disruptions in depression, its descriptions of them are only “cursory” (Ratcliffe 
2014, 5). In particular, while the DSM briefly refers to an impairment in social functioning in 
depression, it does not expand upon how interpersonal relations are altered in depression, nor 
which ones are affected. This is surprising given that most first-person descriptions of 
depression put much emphasis on feelings of isolation and disconnection from others. For 
example, David Karp (2017) in his book Speaking of Sadness, which records both his own and 
others’ lived experience of depression, notes that “the most insistent theme” (2017, 73) that 
arises is the affect depression has on relations with other people; going so far as to describe 
depression as “an illness of isolation, a disease of disconnectedness” (ibid.). 
Many working in phenomenological psychopathology, however, have put the interpersonal 
impact of depression front and centre (e.g. Fuchs 2005, 2013; Ratcliffe 2014; Ratcliffe & 
Stephan 2014; Wehrle 2019). Ratcliffe, in his book Feelings of Depression (2014), devotes a 
whole chapter to detailing how a central feature of depressive experience is a change in the 
structure of interpersonal experience. He describes how feelings of isolation, estrangement, 
distance from the world and from other people frequently crop up in descriptions of depression: 
“The person is cut off from the world and, most importantly, from habitual forms of interaction 
with other people” (Ratcliffe 2014, 31). He claims that there is an erosion of “certain kinds of 
interpersonal relation” in depression (op cit., 202). Ratcliffe is not alone in this diagnosis. 
Fuchs, for instance, argues that an individual’s intercorporeality and interaffectivity with others 
is impacted by depression. Fuchs (2013, 223) describes how the individual with depression 
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loses their ability to be affected by others, that the depressive body “acts as a barrier” to being 
moved by the world and other people.  
This emphasis on social impairment in depression prompts us to ask how this loss of 
connectedness with others is experienced in depression. In this paper, I introduce the notion of 
‘bodily saturation’ as a way to unpack why and how depression disrupts the embodied subject’s 
affective relation with others. There has been increasingly recognition in phenomenology that 
we are affective beings (e.g. Colombetti 2014; Fuchs & Koch 2014; Maiese 2018a); that we do 
not just look upon the world coldly but are moved by the world, experience the world through 
our feeling bodies. However, while the role of our bodies as an affective medium is emphasized, 
what goes unremarked is that while we are feeling beings, we do not have an infinite capacity 
for feeling. The term ‘bodily saturation’ is intended to capture situations where we are, so to 
speak, affectively ‘full’. When this occurs, one is rendered less sensitive, or even insensitive, 
to other affective, bodily experiences. I argue that depression is a bodily intense experience 
that leaves the body saturated, thus disrupting affective ways of feeling connected to and 
together with others.  
1. A disease of disconnectedness 
It is generally acknowledged that depression is an affective disorder. Descriptions of depression 
commonly refer to persistent feelings of depressed mood, anxiety, despondency, worthlessness, 
guilt, isolation and hopelessness. The DSM states that at least one of the symptoms of 
depression is either: 
i) depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day, as indicated by either subjective 
report (e.g., feels sad, empty, hopeless) or observation made by others; or 
ii) markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities most of the 
day, nearly every day.  
Alongside this, the DSM specifies that an individual must experience at least 4 of the following 
additional symptoms:  
i) significant weight loss when not dieting or weight gain or decrease or increase in 
appetite nearly every day; 
ii) insomnia or hypersomnia nearly every day; 
iii) restlessness or lethargy;  
iv) fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day; 
v) feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt; 
vi) diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness; or 
vii) recurrent thoughts of death or suicide.  
(APA 2013, 163)  
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While depression is often associated with feeling deadened or flat, depression is a bodily 
intense experience. As the DSM-V highlights, depression is characterized by feelings of 
lethargy, tiredness, heaviness, sadness, guilt, and/or hopelessness. Even feelings of emptiness 
are not neutral states but involve an acute “felt awareness of absence” (Roberts 2019, 188). As 
I argue below, we might be better doing away with characterizing depression as involving an 
affective flattening and instead talk about depression involving specific forms of affective 
intensity or heightening which excludes other feelings or ways of affectively engaging with the 
world. Moreover, the DMS-V notes that depression can “cause significant distress or 
impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning” (APA 2013, 163). 
How, though, does depression impact one’s social experience? What kinds of social encounters 
are impaired?  
Over the last decade, there has been increased interest in how phenomenology can be used to 
analyse various disturbances found in depression, including discussions of disturbances of 
temporality (e.g. Fuchs 2013; Maiese 2018b; Ratcliffe 2015), personal identity (e.g. Svenaeus 
2013), bodily feelings (e.g. Fuchs & Schlimme 2009; Fuchs 2013) and emotional experience 
(e.g. Slaby 2014; Stephan et al. 2014).1 There has also been increased interest in 
phenomenological psychopathology in how depression involves impairments to one’s social 
experiences (e.g. Fuchs 2005, 2013; Ratcliffe 2014; Ratcliffe & Stephan 2014; Wehrle 2019). 
I want to follow this trend and present a phenomenological assessment of bodily feeling and 
loss of social connectedness in depression. 
First-person descriptions of depression almost uniformly highlight feelings of isolation and 
disconnection from others as central to the disorder (e.g. Karp 2017; Plath 1963; Styron 2010; 
Wurtzel 1994). Sylvia Plath (1963) describes how, when watching others interact, the 
depressed individual experiences a veil between themselves and the others, a distinctive 
experience of being cut off. While depressed individuals can shut themselves away (and many 
often do), this isolation or disconnection is not primarily about a physical distance between the 
depressed individual and others. Indeed, the sense of disconnectedness seems to be most 
painful when the depressed individual is around others, is not physically alone, but feels 
isolated nonetheless: “During all this I felt deeply alone. Everyone else seemed to be moving 
through their days peacefully, laughing and having fun...Their very presence seemed to magnify 
my sense of isolation” (Karp 2017, 59, my italics). Depression, then, is characterized by 
feelings of isolation, disconnection and loneliness even when the depressed individual is not 
by themself.  
Interestingly, what this description from Karp highlights is that not all interpersonal experience 
is diminished in depression. One is not thrown into an entirely solipsistic world, where there 
are no others at all. Others still feature in experience and depressed individuals do not seem to 
lose their ability to understand others entirely. Indeed, in order to capture the experience of 
depressed individuals as missing out, as being cut off from others, some interpersonal 
experience must still be intact; for the depressed individual to experience being cut off from 
another and their happiness, they must be able to perceive the other and their happiness to some 
extent in the first place. Some forms of interpersonal experience and social understanding, then, 
 
1 It is worth noting that phenomenological psychopathology has, traditionally, drawn upon work from classical 
phenomenology and contemporary phenomenologists working in a, by-an-large, traditional phenomenological 
arena. However, with the rise of neo-phenomenology, critical phenomenology, and post-phenomenology, it 
should be recognised that new varieties of phenomenological psychopathology may also arise. For instance, 
neo-phenomenological psychopathology (drawing on the work of, say, Schmitz 2019, Slaby 2020, and Griffero 
2017a), critical phenomenology psychopathology (drawing on the work of, say, Ahmed 2014, Ortega 2016, 
Lugones 1987, and Al-Saji 2010) and post-phenomenological psychopathology (drawing on, say, the work of 
Idhe 2008). 
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are preserved; namely, a visual and perhaps auditory form of direct social perception or 
empathy (Krueger & Overgaard 2012), whereby they are still able to see or hear the expressive 
behaviour of others. What depressed individuals seem to experience is, specifically, a 
diminished sense of connectedness to others. I suggest that we conceive of this sense of 
connectedness to others in affective terms. This will allow us to not only say that there is social 
impairment in depression but provide a more fine-tuned analysis of what forms of social 
relation are impacted in depression; thus, adding to the aforementioned works that highlight 
social disruption as a key characteristic of depression in more general terms. In order to unpack 
this, we must turn to how we not only encounter the other in visual or auditory terms but how 
we feel the other, through our feeling bodies.  
2. Feeling the other  
The phenomenology of sociality highlights numerous forms of interpersonal experience that 
are affective in nature. The phenomenological notion of empathy, which claims that we can 
directly perceive at least some aspects of the other’s experience through their expressive 
bodies, predominately discusses how we visually perceive the other’s experience (e.g. Krueger 
& Overgaard 2012; Overgaard 2019; Zahavi 2014). However, there is growing recognition that 
empathy is not restricted to visual perception but that we can also empathetically perceive the 
other through other sensory modalities (Osler 2021a). Relevant for our purposes is the idea that 
we not only empathetically see someone’s experience, say in their clenched fists and scowl, 
but can empathetically feel the other (e.g. Colombetti 2014; Fuchs 2016; Svenaeus 2016, 2018). 
Drawing on thinkers such as Edith Stein (1989) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2012), the role 
of the feeling body in our empathetic grasp of others is highlighted (sometimes described as 
sensual empathy (e.g. Svenaeus 2018). Thus, I might not only see the other’s anger but feel 
their anger “pouring” out of them (Stein 1989, 54). This is not to suggest that when I feel your 
anger pouring out of you this is because you have made me feel angry, indeed I might be afraid 
of or amused by your anger. Rather, that your anger is given to me affectively, I feel your anger 
without mistaking it for my own emotional reaction.  
Fuchs, in particular, has developed Merleau-Ponty’s notion of intercorporeality to discuss how 
our empathetic perception is rooted in our bodily awareness of and interconnection with others. 
He emphasizes that we do not coldly look upon others but experience a “mutual bodily 
resonance in social encounters” (Fuchs 2013, 222; also see Fuchs 2016; Fuchs & De Jaegher 
2009). Through our bodies we express and connect with others through patterns of imitation, 
co-ordination, bodily expression, and bodily feeling. As such, we do not merely gaze upon 
others but find ourselves bodily present with and bodily affected by others and vice versa. This 
“intercorporeal affection” is highlighted as our fundamental way of being with others and 
feeling ourselves connected to others, as an important “pre-reflective attunement to others” 
(ibid., 225). Where Fuchs (2013, 2016) and Merleau-Ponty (2012) refer to this as 
intercorporeality, the phenomenologist Watsuji pre-emptively describes this felt 
interconnectedness and interrelatedness with others as “betweenness” (Watsuji 1996; see 
Krueger 2020, Osler & Krueger forthcoming). 
Work done on shared emotions also emphasizes the role affectivity has in experiencing oneself 
as together with others. Shared emotions refer to instances where we experience an emotion 
not just as an I but as a We. This is not intended to simply refer to two or more individuals who 
happen to be having the same kind of emotion simultaneously but to individuals experiencing 
an emotion that they experience together. Scheler (2017, 9) famously describes two parents 
sharing their grief over the loss of their child. Influenced by the work of Walther (1923), many 
now argue that when sharing an emotion with another, part of the ‘glue’ that joins people in a 
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shared emotion is a felt sense of togetherness (e.g. Osler 2020; León and Zahavi 2016; Szanto 
2017). Walther argues that togetherness as a We is experienced as something bodily and 
affective. As such, an experience of shared grief is not only bodily felt in terms of feeling grief 
but involves an affective sense of experiencing that grief together with another. If one were 
not able to affectively experience this sense of togetherness, one would not be able to share 
emotions with others.  
We might also refer to notions such as emotional contagion (e.g. Hatfield et al. 2011; Scheler 
2017),2 by which emotions and other affective states are said to pass between embodied 
individuals, and sympathy, where we do not only understand another’s experience but feel for 
them (e.g. Scheler 2017, 12), as other examples of interpersonal encounters that involve an 
affective, bodily felt dimension. Additionally, we might also think of the way we experience 
the atmosphere of grief that emanates from people mourning at a funeral, as well as feeling the 
authority of that atmosphere as demanding us to still our own joyfulness, as a more holistic 
form of interpersonal affective experience (Schmitz 2019; also see Griffero 2014).  
What these examples serve to illustrate is that many of our interpersonal experiences are rooted 
in our bodily experience of others - in feelings of connectedness, being interpersonally moved 
and affected, of feelings of belonging, togetherness and inclusion.3 What underpins these 
various forms of interpersonal experience is not simply being physically present with other 
people but an affective grasping of the other.4 As Fuchs (2013, 223) puts it, in these 
interpersonal encounters our body acts as a “sounding board” through which we engage with 
others.  
What is also interesting about these bodily experiences of the other, is that these encounters 
often move us or prompt us to undergo a change in emotion or mood. For instance, when I feel 
your anger through my body, this might lead me to feeling afraid myself; sharing an emotion 
with another can intensify or prolong an emotional experience; being infected by your 
happiness can lift my mood; feeling excited about your happiness can shift my current emotion; 
experiencing an atmosphere of grief might prompt me to mute my own happiness. As such, not 
only are these examples of affective interpersonal experience, but they are often ways in which 
my emotion or mood is altered or even regulated by others (Krueger 2015).  
It is these affective forms of interpersonal experience that I suggest are inhibited in depression. 
What I argue is that in depression our bodily feelings of, say, tiredness, lethargy, hopelessness 
and so on, are bodily intense experiences and preclude or inhibit one’s ability to be affectively 
sensitive to others, resulting in a sense of disconnectedness from others. I suggest we 
understand this as a temporally-extended and chronic experience of ‘bodily saturation’. 
Cashing depression out in these terms, I think, helps does justice to the felt dimension of 
depression which typically goes overlooked in favour of discussions of depression as involving 
an affective flattening or diminishment.  
3. Bodily saturation 
As highlighted above, phenomenology emphasizes that as embodied, feeling subjects, much 
(if not all) of our engagement with the world is affective (Colombetti 2014). It is through our 
 
2 For a critique of the notion of emotional contagion, see Ahmed 2014.  
3 It should be noted that these forms of interpersonal relations presuppose that we encounter the other as another 
embodied subject in the first place and that we are not dealing with cases of social invisibility (Jardine 2020). 
4 For an argument that this affective grasping of the other can happen even when we are not physically together, 
see Osler 2020. 
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bodies that we are moved, that things draw us in, affect us, and it is our feeling bodies that 
allow us to experience others in affective ways. These approaches highlight that our bodies are 
not simply material objects in the world but are through which we have a world. It is through 
our feeling bodies that we are “affectively involved” with the world: “the conscious subject’s 
constantly being affected by and involved with what goes on—an involvement both realised 
and mediated by corporeal feelings that in turn make manifest (disclose) goings-on in the 
environment” (Schmitz et al. 2011, 243). Importantly, bodily feelings are not tacked on to more 
cognitive ways of assessing the world, nor do bodily feelings simply reveal our bodies to us. 
Rather, our bodily feelings disclose the world to us in an affective manner; they have a certain 
bi-directionality to them, whereby a feeling involves a feeling of one’s body (e.g. a feeling of 
uplift in one’s body) that is also directed towards to world (e.g. one’s best friend). As such, 
bodily feelings can be intentional and their intentional object is not restricted to the subject’s 
bodily state (Ratcliffe 2008, 78; also see Slaby 2008). Using the neo-phenomenological 
lexicon, we can talk of how we are in continual embodied or corporeal communication with 
the world and others (Griffero 2017b; Schmitz 2019).5 
However, what has not gone explored is that while we are feeling beings, we do not have an 
infinite capacity for feeling – we cannot feel all things at all times. I want to introduce a notion 
that I call ‘bodily saturation’. This term is intended to capture situations where we are, so to 
speak, affectively ‘full’. When this occurs, one is rendered less sensitive, or even insensitive, 
to other affective, bodily experiences. When one has a sudden experience of pain, for example, 
it can be experienced so intensely that we seem to only experience that pain. If the pain 
continues, it does so at the expense of feeling much else. When, for example, I have an ongoing 
headache, I feel a kind of distance from the world around me, it no longer solicits my attention 
in the way it normally does, it does not draw me in. My affective engagement with the world 
seems to have been muted by this other bodily intense feeling. This can be thought of as akin 
to a loud noise drowning out all other noises or a flash of bright light taking over one’s visual 
field.  
That pain has this saturating effect is well-supported by cases of self-harm. Self-harm is defined 
by Brown & Kimball (2013, 1) as “the intentional harming of one’s body in order to reduce 
emotional pain and cope with overwhelming emotions”. One might ask why the infliction of 
bodily harm brings about a reduction in ‘emotional pain’. One suggestion is that physical pain, 
in these cases, distracts the individual from their emotional pain. However, I think a better 
formulation of this is to say that the physical pain blocks out one’s capacity to feel the emotional 
pain. If we think of the body as a glass that only has so much room for feeling, then the pain 
can be thought of as filling us up to the top, no longer leaving room for any other feelings. On 
the ‘distraction model’ there is the impression that we can be in emotional pain or distress while 
not feeling it in moments of distraction. The ‘bodily saturation’ formulation avoids the potential 
oxymoron of unfelt feelings, opting for the idea that when we are in intense physical pain, we 
no longer have the capacity to feel anything else.6  
My suggestion is that this bodily saturation can happen at the level of affectivity more broadly, 
that we can be overwhelmed or filled up by a particularly intense feeling (or feelings) which 
renders us insensitive to other feelings at that moment, including the kind of bodily feeling that 
 
5 Thank you to the reviewer who encouraged me to also situate my account in reference to neo-
phenomenological work.  
6 A parallel example of this might be anorexia nervosa. When an individual with anorexia starves themself, they 
subject themselves to a near constant experience of hunger. This is a visceral experience that they might inflict 
upon themself as a way of diminishing their experience of other feelings, such as stress, anxiety or bodily 
upheaval such as puberty, that are outside their control (Osler 2021b; Krueger & Osler 2020). 
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I have argued is part of our felt experience of others. As such, bodily saturation does not only 
occur in cases of bodily sensation (such as pain). We can also be saturated by emotional 
experiences. Think of cases where one feels very anxious about something, like an upcoming 
presentation. Concern about whether your material makes sense, worries about whether 
someone might spot a problem in your account, or ask you a question about a philosopher you 
know next to nothing about, fear that you might forget what you were going to say - this anxiety 
can be so all-consuming that you no longer feel hungry (despite not having eaten yet), no longer 
feel affectively drawn in by the beautiful scenery on the walk to the conference, are left 
untouched by someone excitedly telling you about their upcoming birthday dinner that you are 
invited to.  
The examples I have given so far are of a particular sensation, feeling or emotion that 
overwhelms someone. However, it is also possible for an accumulation of felt experiences to 
oversaturate me (rather than a single, intense feeling). Take, for instance, being in the middle 
of a food market with a friend. There is a cacophony of affective experiences going on, the 
smell of baked goods drawing me in, my friend’s exciting news that she has had an article 
published, my slight anxiety about being hemmed in by many people, the banging noises of 
trucks, people shouting and so on. There is no one single intense affective experience here, 
rather a wide and rich array of them. This can, in some cases, be sensorily too much and prohibit 
my bodily awareness of anything further.7  
Now this is not to say that our bodies are all the same ‘size’. Schmitz (2019, 100) highlights 
that how and to what extent we become affectively involved with the world, how affectively 
sensitive we are, changes from person to person, as well as being impacted by one’s own 
personal history. In a similar vein, then, it should be recognized that we do not all get bodily 
saturated by the same ‘amount’ of feeling, our thresholds might be different. Different 
individuals might have a greater capacity to feel a multitude of things at the same time or to 
feel an intense emotion without experiencing a desensitization to other affective experiences. 
Indeed, an individual may have different bodily capacities at different times in their life, in 
different situations, and so on. Nor is this to imply that bodily saturation only occurs in cases 
of negative sensations or emotions. We can, for instance, have our ‘bodily bandwidth’ used up 
with positive feelings and sensations; think of an experience of intense joy that leaves us 
desensitized to other feelings (e.g. episodes of mania (Bowden 2013; Fuchs 2015)) or intense 
pleasurable experiences like when one orgasms. Moreover, while I have used pain in self-harm 
as an example of how individuals use bodily saturation as a way of blocking out negative 
feelings such as stress or anxiety, it is conceivable that bodily saturation can be sought out in 
and of itself. For example, individuals who enjoy pain as part of their sexual practice might 
enjoy the sensation of being bodily saturated, being entirely in a particular moment and a 
particular feeling, that need not be related to a desire to force out other (negative) feelings. 
Acknowledging all this, the point stands that no individual is capable of an infinite array of 
feelings at any one time. 
4. The depressed body 
How, though, does the notion of bodily saturation inform our understanding of the experience 
of social disconnectedness in depression? What I suggest is that rather than conceiving of 
depression as a case where individuals experience a flattening or deadening of affect, that we 
focus on and recognise the bodily feelings that characterize depression, such as feelings of 
 
7 Those familiar with autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) might seem some similarities between this experience of 
a situation being sensorily and affective overwhelming and common reports of those with ASD as finding the 
world sensorily intense. Applying the notion of bodily saturation to ASD may, then, also be fruitful.  
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tiredness, heaviness, fatigue, and hopelessness and even felt experiences of emptiness, 
listlessness, and absence. By recognising how intense such feelings can be, we can see how 
this picture fits with the notion of bodily saturation, whereby the depressed body is flooded 
with bodily feelings such as tiredness and fatigue that, in turn, diminish one’s ability to enter 
into or be moved by other affective experiences that are bodily felt. If we accept that many of 
our interpersonal encounters are bodily felt, then the saturation that a depressed individual 
experiences inhibits their ability to also experience affective forms of social relation.  
Just as when I am in so much pain, I am not sensitive to someone bumping into my elbow on 
the street, so when my body is saturated with, say, the lethargy of depression, I am no longer 
affectively sensitive to or moved by the happiness of another. I might still see that they are 
happy but no longer feel their happiness radiating from them, do not feel sympathy for the 
other, do not find their happiness contagious, cannot enter into a shared happiness together 
with them. For all these forms of social encounter involve being bodily sensitive and receptive 
to the other, to being moved by the other or feeling a sense of connectedness and togetherness 
with them. The depressed body, already saturated with other bodily feelings, is unable to enter 
into these affective styles of sociality; it does not have the affective bandwidth available that is 
needed for these interpersonal encounters. Thus, the depressed body is still a feeling body but 
it is so full with on-going bodily intense feelings that it is affectively cut adrift from others -
leaving the depressed individual a cold social observer, rather than a bodily engaged, connected 
social participant.  
In contrast to short-lived experiences of bodily saturation, such as the case of stubbing one’s 
toe or having a headache, the depressed body is chronically saturated by certain negative 
feelings. The depressed body undergoes a temporally-extended form of saturation, that impacts 
one’s ability to access other forms of affective experience not just for moments but for 
prolonged periods of time. We might, then, think of depression as involving a chronic, on-
going bodily saturation that can significantly impair an individual’s affective social relations.  
What might be particularly pernicious about depression is that the sorts of social relations that 
are curtailed are the very kinds of social experience that lead to us being moved, to experiences 
that can bring about a change or shift in our emotions and moods. As such, when one is rendered 
bodily insensitive to experiences of sharing emotions, being upregulated by others’ affective 
states, and so on, we can be left in a situation where we become stuck with these negative and 
isolating bodily experiences. By acknowledging this, we can go some way to accounting for 
how depression can progress, leading to a downward spiral of feeling that one cannot escape 
one’s depression.   
Importantly, by employing the notion of bodily saturation, we are able to specifically account 
for why certain forms of social relations are impaired in depression (e.g. those which are 
affective), while preserving other forms of social understanding that remain in place (e.g. the 
ability to grasp that others are happy and are easily engaging with one another and the world). 
This, then, allows us to provide a more fine-grained account of social impairment in depression. 
It also, importantly, enables a distinction to be drawn between the kinds of social impairment 
that characterize a disorder such as major depression disorder and other disorders such as 
catatonia. In catatonia, individuals appear to experience a complete breakdown in one’s bodily 
receptivity to others and the world (Takaoka & Takata 2007), rather than the partial impairment 
I suggest depression typically involves.  
Note that while my account of depression as involving bodily saturation has certain 
commonalities with Fuchs’ discussion of the breakdown of social relations in depression 
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(Fuchs 2005, 2016) it has a key difference. Like Fuchs, I claim that one’s ability to experience 
others in a bodily and affective manner is diminished in depression. Moreover, I root this claim 
in the idea that depression involves a change in the way that one experiences one’s body, 
particularly in terms of experiencing one’s body as ‘closed’ to affective styles of interpersonal 
relation. However, unlike Fuchs, I do not want to characterise the depressed body as a 
corporealized body. According to Fuchs, in depression, the individual primarily experiences 
their body as object-like. He suggests that in depression “the materiality, density, and weight 
[of the body], otherwise suspended and unnoticed in everyday performance, now come to the 
fore and are felt painfully” (2005, 99). The body is experienced as a burdensome object, 
inhibiting one’s ability to smoothly engage with the world as a lived body and, importantly for 
our purposes, inhibiting one’s bodily sensitivity to others.  
My concern with this approach is that while the depressed body is often overwhelmed by 
experiences of, say, fatigue and tiredness, this fatigue and tiredness need not only be 
experienced as foregrounded in our experience, nor solely in terms of experiencing the body 
as object-like (though this is not to say that it cannot be experienced in this way). As Sartre 
(2005) highlights in his description of tiredness, our tiredness can be revealed to us in the way 
that the tired body discloses the world to us: for instance, in the way that I experience the words 
on the page I am reading as blurred, finding it difficult to concentrate on specific tasks. The 
body is not the object of the tiredness here, rather it is a lived tiredness that shows up in the 
way that the world is disclosed to the subject.  
When we talk of the body as the medium through which we have a world, that discloses the 
world to us, we should be careful not to imply that this is a neutral or unfeeling medium. While 
we often see descriptions of the body as transparent (Fuchs 2005, 25) or absent (Leder 1990, 
10) when we are engaging with the world smoothly, this can mask the way in which our feeling 
bodies shape the way in which we experience the world. As Ratcliffe (2008) highlights, our 
bodies do not disclose the world in a uniform manner; our emotions, moods and feelings can 
colour the way we experience the world. When I am joyful, the world is experienced as full of 
exciting possibilities; when I am tired, the world can be experienced as dull and lifeless. 
Feelings of tiredness, then, do not have to foreground the body as object but still impact the 
way in which the world and others are disclosed to us.  
This is to say that in depression feelings of tiredness, fatigue, and hopelessness can be intensely 
felt in the way that the world is disclosed as not interesting, beyond one’s reach, as difficult or 
burdensome. These, though, are still felt experiences of the world, not just felt experiences of 
one’s body as an object. Feelings that characterize depression, then, do not need to render the 
depressed individual corporealized per se. Rather, the depressed body feels these negative 
bodily feelings in such an intense manner that it no longer has the capacity to be affectively 
sensitive to or moved in other ways. The saturated body is not simply closed, is not a complete 
barrier to the world, and does not necessarily have to have the body itself as its intentional 
object. Instead, it is closed to specific forms of affective experience, leaving the individual with 
a limited range of affective options, a limited way in which the world and other people are 
experienced.  
Importantly, this helps us capture cases of individuals who have lived with depression for a 
long time, where feelings of depressed mood become habitualized. When this way of being in 
the world just becomes ‘the way things are’, we do not see the depressed individual as totally 
trapped inside a corporealized body. Many people are still able to go about their lives, do their 
jobs, even hold down stable relationships. One might suppose that if the depressed individual 
predominantly experienced their body as corporealized, this would be a difficult feat to pull 
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off. I suggest that if we adopt a bodily saturation model, we are able to capture how the 
depressed individual still experiences the world and even others in it in some ways; yet are left 
peculiarly disconnected from those around them. In short, then, I pose the notion of bodily 
saturation as an alternative way of conceiving of the depressed body that accounts for 
experience of being disconnected or unable to be moved by others, that I think provides a richer 
picture of the depressed individual and their world.  
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have developed the notion of ‘bodily saturation’ as a way of unpacking how 
depressed individuals experience a sense of disconnectedness from others. While we are feeling 
bodies, we do not have infinite capacity for feeling and can become saturated with our affective 
experiences. When this occurs, we are rendered insensitive to other affective or feeling 
experiences. Depression, I have argued, is an intensely felt affective disorder. I suggest that the 
intense feelings characteristic of depression leave individuals insensitive to ‘feeling the other’, 
thus impairing certain social encounters and interactions, as well as their social understanding. 
This, though, does not mean that the depressed individual primarily experiences their body as 
the object of their experience. Rather, the saturated body in depression is rendered insensitive 
to certain forms of affective experience, including a raft of affective social experiences such as 
sensual empathy, shared emotions and other shared experiences, intercorporeality, 
interaffectivity, interpersonal atmospheres, emotional contagion, and sympathy. All these 
affective forms of interpersonal experience are ones which connect our embodied selves with 
others in terms of how we feel the other as present, feel the other’s feelings, feel sympathy for 
others, or feel together with others. When these interpersonal experiences are impaired, an 
individual is left with a peculiar sense of isolation.  
Using the notion of bodily saturation, we can move towards a more fine-grained picture of 
depression and social impairment. Whereby we can elucidate how the depressed body is 
affectively cut off from others and which forms of interpersonal experiences might be 
compromised by this. Moreover, while I have developed the notion of bodily saturation in the 
context of self-harm and depression, I think it could be fruitfully applied to other disorders 
(such as anorexia nervosa and autistic spectrum disorder), as well as to positive experiences of 
bodily saturation such as orgasm and BDSM practices. With increased recognition that we are 
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